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1 Introduction
South African constitutional scholars have been puzzling for some time 
over a basic tension in the Constitutional Court’s voting rights jurisprudence. 
While some of its judgments show a commitment to a vigorous defence and 
enforcement of an inclusive, egalitarian and participatory vision of democracy 
and an active notion of citizenship, others appear to be characterised by a 
deferential posture and a shallow conception of democracy. The court’s 
emphasis on the centrality of the right to vote to dignity and democratic 
citizenship and its endorsement of the voting rights of marginalised categories 
of persons such as prisoners
1
 is seemingly contradicted by its willingness, 
in cases like New National Party of South Africa v The Government of the 
Republic of South Africa (“NNP”)
2
 and United Democratic Movement v 
President of the Republic of South Africa (1) (“UDM”),
3
 to defer to legislative 
choices. The deferential posture struck in these cases sits uneasily with the 
widely shared assumption that democracy itself requires judicial vigilance in 
the face of electoral rules that tend to thwart electoral competition and distort 
the representative nature of government. It is also at odds with later judgments 
dealing with political rights other than the right to vote, in which a robust, 
participatory vision of democracy formed the basis for successful challenges 
to the validity of conduct or legislation.
4
Academic analyses of these judgments have focused, for the most part, 
on the standards of review employed by the Constitutional Court, and the 
level of judicial interference or restraint at work in these cases. The resulting 
focus on institutional and separation of powers concerns has proved helpful 
 
I am indebted to the National Research Foundation and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for 
financial assistance.
 1 
August v Electoral Commission 1999 3 SA 1 (CC); Minister of Home Affairs v NICRO 2004 5 BCLR 445 
(CC).
2 
1999 3 SA 191 (CC).
3 
2003 1 SA 488 (CC).
4 
The court struck down two Acts of Parliament in Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National 
Assembly 2006 6 SA 416 (CC) and an Act of Parliament and a constitutional amendment in Matatiele 
Municipality v President of the Republic of South Africa (2) 2007 1 BCLR 47 (CC) for a failure on the 
part of the legislature to facilitate adequate public involvement in the legislative process. In Ramakatsa 
v Magashule 2013 2 BCLR 202 (CC), the Free State provincial elective conference of the ANC was 
declared void in view of certain irregularities that were held to breach both the constitutional right to 
participate in the activities of a political party (s 19(1)) and the ANC’s constitution and audit guidelines. 
And in Oriani-Ambrosini v Speaker of the National Assembly 2012 6 SA 588 (CC), certain rules of the 
National Assembly were invalidated to the extent that they required the National Assembly’s permission 
before a member could introduce a Bill in terms of s 73(2) of the Constitution. The court interpreted the 
relevant constitutional provisions in view of the principles of representative and participatory democracy, 
multiparty democracy, pluralism, democratic deliberation, responsiveness, accountability and openness.
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in explaining and critiquing some of the apparent anomalies in the court’s 
jurisprudence, and in suggesting alternative approaches that would protect 
voting rights more rigorously. At the same time, it has resulted in an under-
emphasis on the substantive content of the right to vote. Academic criticisms 
of the shallow conception of democracy that is supposedly at work in the 
NNP and UDM judgments, is as a rule supplemented neither by a critical 
analysis of the court’s substantive understanding of the right to vote, nor by 
the development of an alternative interpretive framework for understanding 
this right.
This article takes a different approach. It places the emphasis on the 
Constitutional Court’s substantive understanding of the right to vote, and 
is interested in the role played by constitutional values like dignity and 
democracy in the interpretation of this right. On the one hand, it asks whether 
and to what extent the Constitutional Court’s dignity-based construction of 
voting rights can explain the apparent anomalies and contradictions referred 
to above. Does the court’s focus on dignity, coupled with its failure to flesh 
out the meaning of democracy in the voting rights context, result in an 
interventionist stance in some cases and an overly deferential one in others? 
Does it blind the court to the ways in which seemingly neutral measures feed 
into systemic disadvantage and further the political disempowerment of the 
poor and marginalised? Does it shift the attention away from structural issues 
relating to democratic accountability and electoral competition, and pay too 
much attention to the symbolic value of the vote? 
On the other hand, the article asks whether an articulation of dignity with 
the values of democracy, equality and citizenship might provide the basis for 
a more rigorous understanding of the right to vote. First of all, how could 
such an understanding enable a jurisprudence that is responsive to the ways 
in which electoral laws intersect with systemic disadvantage and structural 
power, to reproduce private inequality in the political sphere? Secondly, how 
would it react to struggles for the extension of the right to vote to those who 
are subject to state power, but are excluded from membership in the political 
community by virtue of their nationality? 
2 The Constitutional Court’s voting rights jurisprudence
2 1 The dignity of citizenship: August and NICRO
In August v Electoral Commission (“August”), the Constitutional Court held 
that the failure of the Electoral Commission to take steps to allow prisoners to 
register and vote amounted to an impermissible restriction of section 19(3)(a).
5
 
The court was clear that convicts do not forfeit all their rights upon entering 
prison – even under common law, prisoners retained a residue of personal 
rights that were not excluded by law.
6
 It rejected the reasoning of the court a 
quo, which had held that the prisoners’ inability to register and vote was of 
5 
S 19(3)(a): “Every adult citizen has the right to vote in elections for any legislative body established in 
terms of the Constitution, and to do so in secret”.
6 
August v Electoral Commission 1999 3 SA 1 (CC) paras 18-19.
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their own making. Instead, it stressed that the right to vote imposes positive 
obligations on the state, and that it is untenable to equate prisoners’ position 
with that of other citizens who find it difficult or impractical to exercise 
the vote. Since their inability to register and vote arose directly from their 
incarceration by the state and from the failure to make provision for them, the 
Electoral Commission could not escape responsibility for their plight.
7
 
It was unnecessary for the court to pronounce on the question whether 
the disenfranchisement of prisoners constituted a reasonable and justifiable 
limitation of the right to vote in accordance with section 36 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the “Constitution”). This was because 
the restriction was not sourced in the Electoral Act 73 of 1998 (“Electoral 
Act”), but resulted from the inaction of the Electoral Commission. In the 
absence of a law of general application there was no need to engage in an 
assessment of proportionality or to balance the state’s objectives against the 
severity of the limitation. The court expressly left open the possibility that 
legislation, which disenfranchises certain categories of prisoners, could be 
justifiable under section 36.8 
Despite the narrowness of its holding, the judgment nevertheless suggests 
that, given the importance of the right and the history of its suppression under 
apartheid, limitations would be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. In an oft-quoted 
passage, Sachs J endorsed the universality of the vote in the following terms: 
“Universal adult suffrage on a common voters roll is one of the foundational values of our entire 
constitutional order. The achievement of the franchise has historically been important both for the 
acquisition of the rights of full and effective citizenship by all South Africans regardless of race, and 
for the accomplishment of an all-embracing nationhood. The universality of the franchise is important 
not only for nationhood and democracy. The vote of each and every citizen is a badge of dignity and 
of personhood. Quite literally, it says that everybody counts. In a country of great disparities of wealth 
and power it declares that whoever we are, whether rich or poor, exalted or disgraced, we all belong 
to the same democratic South African nation; that our destinies are intertwined in a single interactive 
polity”.
9
In the view of the court, laws and measures which deprive South Africans 
of equal citizenship not only impoverish democracy and are at odds with 
the inclusive community of equals established by the Constitution, but also 
impair the human dignity of those deprived of the basic rights of citizenship. 
Dignity is here articulated with a range of other values, including citizenship, 
representative democracy, political equality, nationhood and belonging. By 
grounding the right to vote in this formidable cluster of values, the judgment 
appears to set the bar quite high for the justification of the disenfranchisement 
of categories of South African citizens. A compelling justification would 
presumably be needed for limitations which signal that some adult citizens 
are incapable of meaningful participation in political life or are unworthy 
of integration into the political community. Yet, in view of the gap between 
the breadth of Sachs J’s rhetoric, the depth of his democratic vision and the 
7 
Paras 20-22.
8 
Para 31.
9 
Para 17.
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narrowness of the holding, it remained to be seen how rigorously the court 
would scrutinise statutory exclusions of prisoners from the right to vote.
Five years later, the constitutionality of legislation which disenfranchised 
prisoners came before the court in Minister of Home Affairs v NICRO 
(“NICRO”).
10 The law in question disqualified all convicted prisoners serving 
sentences of imprisonment without the option of a fine from the right to vote. 
The majority judgment of Chaskalson CJ rejected the state’s contention that 
the limitation was reasonable in view of logistical difficulties or in terms of 
the state’s prerogative to choose to use scarce resources to enable law-abiding 
citizens to vote. In the first place, the court found that the state had failed 
to establish a factual basis for its contention that allowing prisoners to vote 
would place an undue burden on its resources. No information relating to 
expenditure or logistical problems was placed before the court. It was also 
not explained why it would impose an undue burden on the resources of the 
Electoral Commission if the existing arrangements that allowed unsentenced 
prisoners and prisoners who had not paid their fines to vote, were to be 
extended to other prisoners.
11
 
Secondly, while the court showed some sympathy for the argument 
that restricting the right of prisoners to vote signalled the government’s 
denunciation of crime, it was clearly frustrated at the clumsy way in which 
the objective had been formulated. Quoting at length from both the majority 
and minority judgments in Sauvé v Canada (Chief Electoral Officer),12 
Chaskalson CJ pointed out that in that case, the Canadian Supreme Court 
had had the benefit of extensive policy arguments for and against prisoner 
disenfranchisement. In NICRO, by contrast, these issues had been introduced 
“almost tangentially”.
13
 It was, however, unnecessary to decide whether 
and when such policy considerations should be allowed to override the 
right of prisoners to vote, as the court found that the blanket exclusion of 
all prisoners sentenced without the option of a fine was overbroad and thus 
unconstitutional. Since no information was placed before the court relating to 
the types of offences included in this category, or the number of persons who 
were disenfranchised for relatively minor transgressions, the provision could 
not be held to be proportionate to a legitimate state objective.
14
 
The minority judgments of Madala J and Ngcobo J were far less exacting 
in their demand for state justification of restrictions of the vote, and more 
willing to override inclusivity in the name of civic responsibility. Madala 
J and Ngcobo J both found that the true purpose of the limitation was to 
denounce crime and to inculcate in citizens a sense of their responsibilities 
and obligations. In the view of Madala J, the temporary disenfranchisement of 
prisoners was proportionate to this important purpose.
15
 Ngcobo J agreed, but 
10 
2004 5 BCLR 445 (CC).
11 
Paras 47-51.
12 
2002 SCC 68.
13 
2004 5 BCLR 445 (CC) para 66.
14 
Para 67.
15 
Paras 113-117 and 126. 
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found that the limitation went too far to the extent that it included in its ambit 
prisoners awaiting the outcome of an appeal.
16
The majority judgment, by contrast, insists that the factual basis for the 
justification of the disenfranchisement of citizens must be clearly established; 
the policy grounds relied upon by the state “must be accurately and precisely 
defined”;17 and limitations of the right to vote must be carefully and narrowly 
crafted. These requirements follow, by and large, from the court’s general 
approach to limitation analysis under section 36. In practice, however, the 
stringency of their application tends to vary, depending on the seriousness of 
the limitation in question.
18 The majority arguably tightened the justificatory 
burden due to the importance of the right to vote to constitutional values like 
dignity and democracy and the extent of prisoners’ disenfranchisement.
19
 As 
a result, the court was less willing to accept justifications based on “common-
sense” assumptions that were not backed up by clear factual evidence and 
policy arguments, or to countenance measures that were not narrowly 
tailored.
20
 
The judgment nevertheless does not close the door on criminal 
disenfranchisement. It contains few hints as to the relative weight to be 
accorded to voting rights vis-à-vis state objectives such as the denunciation of 
crime and the promotion of civic responsibility, or the rigour with which the 
less restrictive means test will be applied. A more narrowly tailored limitation 
of prisoners’ voting rights may well be held to pass constitutional scrutiny.
21
 
2 2 Responsibility and restraint: NNP and UDM
The NNP case concerned a challenge to the constitutionality of a legislative 
requirement that voters had to have either a green bar-coded identity document 
or a temporary identification certificate. Older forms of identification did 
not suffice. The requirement was controversial, as surveys indicated that a 
substantial part of the population did not have the required identity documents 
16 
Paras 138-140 and 143-145.
17 
Para 65 (quoting from McLachlin CJ in Sauvé v Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) 2002 SCC 68 para 23). 
See also para 36 (“the party relying on justification should place sufficient information before the court 
as to the policy that is being furthered, the reasons for that policy, and why it is considered reasonable in 
pursuit of that policy to limit a constitutional right”).
18 
This is in terms of the court’s general approach to the factors enumerated in s 36, in terms of which it does 
“not adhere mechanically to a sequential check-list”, but rather engages in “a balancing exercise” through 
which it arrives at “a global judgment on proportionality”. S v Manamela (Director-General of Justice 
Intervening) 2000 3 SA 1 (CC) para 32. In Minister of Home Affairs v NICRO 2004 5 BCLR 445 (CC) 
para 37, the court similarly stated: 
“Ultimately what is involved in a limitation analysis is the balancing of means and ends.” 
19 
See Minister of Home Affairs v NICRO 2004 5 BCLR 445 (CC) para 47.
20 
See S Woolman & H Botha “Limitations” in S Woolman, M Bishop & J Brickhill (eds) Constitutional 
Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2006) 34-85 – 34-92 for an analysis of the Constitutional Court’s approach 
to the less restrictive means requirement.
21 
See L Muntingh & J Sloth-Nielsen “The Ballot as a Bulwark: Prisoners’ Right to Vote in South Africa” in 
AC Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 
221 238, who argue that future legislative attempts to disenfranchise serious offenders could conceivably 
survive constitutional challenges, in view of factors such as the over- breadth of the legislation in Minister 
of Home Affairs v NICRO 2004 5 BCLR 445 (CC), the poor quality of argument advanced on behalf of 
the state, the dissenting judges’ greater readiness to find that the state met its justificatory burden, and 
possible shifts resulting from new appointments to the Constitutional Court.
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and that it was unlikely that the Department of Home Affairs would be able to 
issue all the documents in time for the forthcoming election. The majority, in a 
judgment authored by Yacoob J, held that the requirement was constitutional. 
Parliament had to ensure that those eligible to vote would be able to do so if 
they took reasonable steps in pursuit of that right. Whether or not the potential 
consequence of a law would be to disable prospective voters from voting, 
even if they acted reasonably, had to be assessed in view of the circumstances 
pertaining at the time of the enactment of the provisions, and not those existing 
at the time of the challenge to the validity of the legislation.
22
 Moreover, 
the court was not to test the reasonableness of the electoral scheme (except 
insofar as an infringement of section 19(3) was found, in which case the 
reasonableness of the limitation would be assessed in terms of section 36(1)). 
The question was, rather, whether the legislation was rationally connected to a 
legitimate government purpose.
23
 This test, in the majority’s view, recognises 
that it is up to Parliament, and not the courts, to determine how voters are 
to identify themselves.
24
 The court found that the legislation was rationally 
connected to the legitimate government purpose of ensuring the integrity of 
the electoral process, and that it did not amount to a denial of the right to vote. 
It dismissed concerns over the capacity of the Department of Home Affairs 
to issue the required documents to applicants within a short span of time, 
arguing that those concerns pertained to the implementation of the Act, rather 
than to its constitutionality.
25
While the majority’s emphasis on voters’ responsibility resonates with the 
idea of active citizenship, the deferential nature of its rationality enquiry, 
coupled with its insistence that the constitutionality of the legislation must 
be assessed at the time of its enactment and must be separated from issues 
arising out of its implementation, is cause for concern.
26
 In her dissent, 
O’Regan J questioned the idea that voters are required to show that they 
have acted reasonably, but that the court is barred from inquiring into the 
reasonableness of the measures adopted by Parliament. This test, in her view, 
ignores the diversity of South Africa’s population, and simply assumes that 
what is reasonable for some (for example educated and affluent urban voters) 
is also reasonable for others (for example poor and illiterate rural voters).
27
 
Proposing instead a test that requires legislative regulation of the right to vote 
to be reasonable, she found that the objectives sought to be advanced by the 
22 
New National Party of South Africa v The Government of the Republic of South Africa 1999 3 SA 191 (CC) 
paras 21-23.
23 
Para 24.
24 
Para 19.
25 
Paras 37-47.
26 
The majority judgment in NNP has been widely criticised in the academic literature. See T Roux 
“Democracy” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 
2006) 10-55 – 10-57; J Brickhill & R Babiuch “Political Rights” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 2007) 45-18 – 45-21; T Roux The Politics of Principle: The 
First South African Constitutional Court, 1995-2005 (2013) 341-350. But see also J Fowkes “Right After 
All: Reconsidering New National Party in the South African Canon” (2015) 31 SAJHR 151 for a more 
positive appraisal of the judgment.
27 
New National Party of South Africa v The Government of the Republic of South Africa 1999 3 SA 191 (CC) 
para 126.
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legislation did not justify the restriction of the rights of prospective voters who 
were in possession of older (non-bar-coded) identity documents.
28
 
The level of deference shown by the majority in NNP raises questions over 
the capacity of the court’s construction of section 19(3) to promote a conception 
of citizenship which is rooted in a culture of democratic participation, and is 
capable of challenging societal inequality and exclusion in the public-political 
sphere. If the universality of the franchise is indeed, as Sachs J suggested in 
August, a powerful reminder of the intertwined destinies of all citizens, rich 
and poor,
29
 and if, as will be argued below,
30
 such a common citizenship is 
an important corrective to the inequalities found in the private sphere, one 
would expect the courts to be more vigilant in their examination of measures 
which may have the effect of reproducing existing patterns of socio-economic 
disadvantage in the political sphere. Not only those measures which expressly 
exclude certain categories of citizens from voting, but also those which 
impose unreasonable barriers to the exercise of the vote should be subjected 
to rigorous scrutiny. This is particularly so where the legislative regulation of 
the right to vote has a disproportionate impact on the poor, illiterate and other 
marginalised groups.
One would also expect the courts to be more exacting in their analysis of 
features of the electoral system which diminish the importance of the vote or 
dilute the accountability of representatives. In UDM
31
 the court considered 
the constitutionality of a legislative package – including two constitutional 
amendments – allowing legislators to cross the floor to another political party 
without losing their seats. It was argued inter alia that the constitutional 
amendments violated the basic structure of the Constitution and that they were 
inconsistent with the founding value of multi-party democracy as entrenched 
in section 1(d) of the Constitution. The court rejected these contentions. It 
found that, even if the basic structure doctrine, as developed in India, applied 
in South Africa – a question it declined to decide – the amendments in 
question did not touch the inviolable core of the Constitution. That is because 
“proportional representation, and the anti-defection provisions which support 
it”, could not be said to be “so fundamental to our constitutional order as to 
preclude any amendment of their provisions”.
32
 The court relied on similar 
reasons in rejecting the challenge based on the value of multi-party democracy. 
It held that proportional representation is not an inherent requirement of 
democracy and that a system of proportional representation without an anti-
defection clause is not necessarily inconsistent with a multi-party system of 
democratic government.
33
 
This line of reasoning is surprising, given the court’s earlier judgment in 
the Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (“First Certification”) 
28 
Paras 146-161.
29 
1999 3 SA 1 (CC) para 17.
30 
See part 4 1 below.
31 
2003 1 SA 488 (CC). 
32 
Para 17.
33 
Paras 29, 34.
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case
34
, in which it rejected an objection against the anti-defection clause in 
schedule 6 to the Constitution. In that case, the court recognised the close 
link that exists between voters and political parties under a list system of 
proportional representation, and the role of an anti-defection clause in 
ensuring that “the will of the electorate is honoured”.
35
 It also acknowledged 
the threat that, in the absence of an anti-defection clause, the governing party 
could use its power to entice members of minority parties to join it, thus 
enabling it to misrepresent the views of the electorate.
36
 The UDM Court, by 
contrast, relativized the distinction between proportional and constituency-
based forms of representation. It stated that, in constituency-based systems, “a 
member who defects to another party during the life of a legislature is equally 
open to the accusation that he or she has betrayed the voters”.
37
 Different 
forms of representation are here compared at such a high level of abstraction 
that the specific difficulties inherent in the attempt to combine floor crossing 
with a list system of proportional representation are obscured from view. 
This enables the court to treat floor crossing simply as a matter of legislative 
choice, which has little or no bearing on the value of multi-party democracy 
or the right to vote.
38
 
Other parts of the judgment similarly reveal a restrictive understanding 
of democracy and a high degree of deference towards Parliament. Consider, 
for example, the court’s response to the applicants’ references to democratic 
countries with proportional systems of representation in which defection 
is not allowed. The court brushed these references aside by observing that 
the applicants did not cite any foreign case law in which it was held that, 
“absent a constitutional or legislative requirement to that effect, a member of a 
legislature is obliged to resign if he or she changes party allegiance during the 
life of a legislature”.
39 To require a holding at that level of specificity is to place 
the threshold for the relevance of foreign law quite high. This restrictive view 
of the role of foreign law is borne out in the rest of the judgment. No reference 
is made to the considerable body of comparative literature on the meaning 
of “multi-party democracy” or to foreign case law in which courts have 
pronounced on the constitutionality of electoral rules that purportedly distort 
the will of the voters and/or skew the proportionality of representation.
40
 This 
is surprising, given the court’s claim that it could find no assistance from 
commentaries on the South African Constitution relating to the meaning 
of multi-party democracy.
41
 A consideration of foreign judgments might 
not have provided the court with clear-cut answers to the difficult questions 
confronting it in this case, but it would, in all likelihood, have enriched its 
34 
1996 4 SA 744 (CC).
35 
Para 186.
36 
Para 187.
37 
2003 1 SA 488 (CC) para 34.
38 
See, for a rigorous critique of this and other aspects of the judgment, Roux “Democracy” in CLOSA 
10-26 – 10-29; Roux The Politics of Principle 351-362.
39 
2003 1 SA 488 (CC) para 35.
40 
Cf the references to foreign case law in part 3 1 below.
41 
2003 1 SA 488 (CC) para 25.
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analysis of key concepts and enhanced its understanding of the judiciary’s role 
in promoting a multi-party system of democratic government. 
Consider, also, the court’s rejection of the argument that the 10% threshold 
requirement for defections would benefit bigger parties at the expense 
of smaller ones. The court insisted that “[t]he fact that a particular system 
operates to the disadvantage of particular parties does not mean that it is 
unconstitutional”,
42
 and that the details of a legal regime allowing defection 
must be left to Parliament. This reasoning has been criticised for its failure 
to situate the controversy over floor crossing within the context of the ruling 
party’s electoral dominance, and for its lack of understanding of the court’s 
role in interrogating measures that tend to inhibit electoral competition or 
skew electoral outcomes.
43
 
The UDM Court also rejected a challenge based on the alleged violation 
of the right to vote in terms of section 19(3) of the Constitution. It held 
that between elections, “voters have no control over the conduct of their 
representatives”
44
 and that, if they are unhappy with the way in which elected 
representatives conduct themselves, their remedy lies in not voting for 
them during the next election.
45
 Again, these statements point to a shallow 
conception of democracy and a problematic understanding of the court’s 
role in guarding against distortions of the democratic process. They have 
given rise to criticisms for what is seen as the court’s fixation on the act of 
voting, its consequent neglect of the democratic processes leading up to and 
underpinning elections,
46
 and its under-estimation of the different ways in 
which a single party’s dominance can inhibit the growth of opposition parties 
and stifle democratic contestation.47 
2 3 Mixed messages: Richter and AParty
In Richter v Minister of Home Affairs (“Richter”),48 the Constitutional Court 
was asked to confirm the invalidation by the High Court of section 33(1)(e) 
of the Electoral Act, which allowed certain voters who were temporarily 
absent from the Republic to apply for a special vote. The High Court had held 
that the section amounted to unfair discrimination, as it restricted the special 
vote to a few categories of voters who were abroad on polling day, namely 
those who were overseas for purposes of a holiday, a business trip, attendance 
of a tertiary institution, an educational visit or participation in an international 
sports event. The High Court sought to remove the discrimination by severing 
the reference to the five categories of voters mentioned above, and by severing 
the word “temporary”. 
42 
Para 47.
43 
S Choudhry “‘He Had a Mandate’: The South African Constitutional Court and the African National 
Congress in a Dominant Party Democracy” (2009) 2 CCR 1 37-48.
44 
2003 1 SA 488 (CC) para 49.
45 
Para 50.
46 
See G Quinot “Snapshot or Participatory Democracy? Political Engagement as Fundamental Human 
Right” (2009) 25 SAJHR 392.
47 
Choudhry (2009) CCR 37-48; S Issacharoff “Constitutional Courts and Democratic Hedging” (2011) 99 
Georgetown LJ 961 997-1001.
48 
2009 3 SA 615 (CC).
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The Constitutional Court upheld the High Court’s order, subject to a few 
relatively minor alterations. Its reasoning was different, though. It declined 
to decide whether section 33(1)(e) constituted unfair discrimination, and held 
instead that it unjustifiably limited the right to vote. Writing for a unanimous 
court, O’Regan J held that, while it was not unreasonable to require voters 
to travel some distance from their homes to the polling station or to stand 
in queues, they could not reasonably be expected to “travel thousands of 
kilometres across the globe to be in their voting district on voting day”.
49
 
The failure to give registered voters who were abroad on voting day an 
opportunity to apply for a special vote, amounted to a limitation of section 
19(3). The respondents had not proffered any justification for restricting the 
categories of voters who qualified for a special vote, nor could the court think 
of a legitimate purpose served by it. The limitation therefore did not pass 
scrutiny under section 36. 
The court confirmed the High Court’s order which not only severed 
the words which restricted the special vote to specific classes of absentee 
voters, but also severed the word “temporary”. As a result, the judgment 
extended the vote not only to all registered voters temporarily absent from 
the Republic, irrespective of the reasons for their absence, but also to those 
registered voters whose absence is permanent. This is surprising, as Wessel 
le Roux has shown.
50
 The requirement that voters must have their ordinary 
residence in the Republic has been a central feature of the electoral system. 
One would certainly not expect the court to overturn this requirement without 
hearing argument on the reasons underpinning it and without considering the 
constitutionality of a residence-based system. And yet, this is exactly what 
the court appears to have done. The judgment contains no reference to the 
close connection under the Electoral Act between residence, registration and 
voting, nor does it provide any reasons for the confirmation of the second 
severance order.
51
The severance of the word “temporary” is even more puzzling in view of the 
court’s judgment in AParty v Minister for Home Affairs, Moloko v Minister for 
Home Affairs (“AParty”),52 which was delivered on the same day as Richter. 
The court in AParty rejected an application for direct access to challenge the 
constitutionality of provisions in the Electorate Act which preclude South 
African citizens not ordinarily resident in South Africa from registering 
as voters. Writing for a unanimous court, Ngcobo J reasoned that it was 
undesirable for it to sit as a court of first and final instance on matters which 
“go to the very heart of the electoral scheme chosen by Parliament”, and which 
raise “complex and difficult questions concerning the constitutional validity 
49 
Para 68.
50 
W le Roux “Migration, Street Democracy and Expatriate Voting Rights” (2009) 24 SAPL 370 383-398; 
& W le Roux “Economic Migration, Disaggregated Citizenship and the Right to Vote in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa” in R Danisch (ed) Citizens of the World: Pluralism, Migration and Practices of Citizenship 
(2011) 119 122-127.
51 
Le Roux (2009) SAPL 383. 
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2009 6 BCLR 611 (CC).
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of this electoral scheme and the legislative choice made by Parliament”.
53
 His 
judgment stressed Parliament’s constitutionally mandated role in devising an 
electoral system,
54
 emphasised that a court should not prescribe to Parliament 
which scheme to choose from a range of legitimate options,
55
 and made it clear 
that questions about the constitutionality of the electoral scheme ought to be 
properly canvased, with input from all parties, including the Minister and the 
Electoral Commission.
56
 
The AParty judgment makes it seem unlikely that the court in Richter 
intended to sever the link established in the Electoral Act between ordinary 
residence and rights of political participation. However, the latter reading 
has been actively promoted by the expatriate voting rights lobby,
57
 and also 
appears to have informed recent amendments to the Electoral Act which allow 
South African citizens to register as voters while abroad.
58
 While some would 
describe this outcome as a victory for the universality of the franchise, the 
process that gave rise to it can hardly be described as an instance of reasoned 
democratic deliberation or of a rational dialogue between the courts and 
Parliament. To start with, the Constitutional Court’s confirmation of the 
second severance order is unsupported by any reasons, flies in the face of its 
usual caution in intervening in the electoral scheme designed by Parliament 
and appears to be contradicted by the AParty judgment. Moreover, Parliament 
unquestioningly accepted a reading of the Richter judgment which is in fact 
far from uncontroversial. 
The net result is that a valuable opportunity has been lost for democratic 
deliberation over the basis of political rights. Wessel le Roux argues that 
the uncritical conflation of citizenship and nationality – if not in the Richter 
judgment itself, then in its interpretation by the expatriate voting rights lobby 
and by Parliament – stands in the way of struggles for the extension of voting 
rights to non-nationals who are permanently resident in South Africa. To 
this extent, Richter has resulted in a foreclosure of the democratic processes 
through which the bounds of the political community are contested and 
redrawn. Moreover, it has done so without engaging in any reasoning over 
the relationship between voting rights, nationality and residence, and without 
hearing any argument on these matters.
59
 
3 Explaining the anomalies
The picture emerging from the above discussion of the Constitutional 
Court’s voting rights jurisprudence is confusing and contradictory. Despite 
the court’s glowing rhetoric on the importance of universal adult suffrage in 
judgments like August and NICRO, it struck a deferential pose in cases like 
NNP and UDM in which alleged limitations of the right to vote stopped short 
53 
Para 55. 
54 
S 46(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
55 
2009 6 BCLR 611 (CC) para 55.
56 
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59 
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of the patent disenfranchisement of classes of citizens. In Richter, on the other 
hand, it appears to have thrown all caution to the wind by issuing an order that 
impacts directly on the electoral scheme devised by Parliament, without even 
engaging the underlying issues. By contrast, the AParty judgment, delivered 
on the same day, expressly declined to interfere with the electoral system 
designed by Parliament without a proper consideration of the issues.
A number of explanations for these apparent contradictions have been 
mooted in the academic literature. This section considers two of these 
explanations. The first takes its cue from the distinction between rights and 
structures, while the second centres on the distinction between principle 
and pragmatism. Drawing on and critically analysing these accounts, a third 
possible explanation is explored, which relates the tensions in the court’s 
jurisprudence to the way in which it has placed human dignity at the centre 
of voting rights. 
3 1 Rights and structures
In an essay on the role of constitutional courts in protecting the integrity 
of democratic structures and processes in societies in transition, Samuel 
Issacharoff argues that the judgment in UDM represents a retreat from the first 
certification judgment’s attention to “structural restraints on the centralization 
of power” and commitment to the policing of “excess[es] of democracy”.
60
 The 
certification judgment evinced a keen understanding of the ways in which the 
Constitutional Principles had sought to prevent democratic structures from 
being subverted by a dominant political party intent on maximising its own 
interests in the name of the people. The UDM Court, by contrast, denied that 
the ANC’s powerful position and capacity to benefit from floor crossing had 
any constitutional relevance. In doing so, it “retreated to a formalist account of 
the Constitution as guaranteeing primarily procedural norms and individual 
rights”.
61
 Instead, the court should have used the opportunity to “reassert the 
structural underpinnings” of the certification judgment.62 This it could have 
done by drawing on the constitutional guarantee of effective minority party 
participation, and with reference to the basic structure doctrine as developed 
by the Indian Supreme Court.
63
 
The distinction between rights and structures is also central to Sujit 
Choudhry’s analysis of the role of the Constitutional Court in South Africa’s 
dominant party democracy. Drawing on Issacharoff and Pildes’ distinction 
between “the ‘foreground’ of constitutional rights” and the “background rules 
that structure partisan political competition”,
64
 Choudhry argues that the 
60 
Issacharoff (2011) Georgetown LJ 995.
61 
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998.
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999-1001. In a subsequent contribution, Issacharoff argues that the case law of the Colombian 
Constitutional Court and the Indian Supreme Court could provide useful pointers in the development of 
such a jurisprudence. See S Issacharoff “The Democratic Risk to Democratic Transitions” (2012) 5 CCR 1 
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Constitutional Court has focused too narrowly on the violation of individual 
rights and paid too little attention to the ways in which basic features of 
the constitutional design – such as electoral competition – are distorted 
through laws and measures aimed at consolidating the ANC’s domination. 
In his view, judicial review is generally more effective when it addresses the 
underlying, structural causes of democratic malaise – such as the erosion 
of political competition – and does not simply treat the symptoms, in the 
form of individual rights violations. The court has, by and large, missed this 
point. Failing to grasp the extent to which commonplace assumptions about 
democratic accountability are undermined in a dominant party democracy, it 
has neglected to develop doctrines able to arrest the pathologies arising from 
the ANC’s dominance.
65
The distinction between individual rights violations and their structural 
causes is a familiar one which has featured prominently in, among other 
contexts, the literature on socio-economic rights. It is frequently asked 
whether the Constitutional Court’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence 
gets the balance right between doing justice to the individual litigants and 
addressing the structural impediments to the realisation of these rights in 
ways that go beyond the individual dispute before it. The court is sometimes 
criticised for failing to develop standards providing adequate guidance to lower 
courts and organs of state, which would allow socio-economic disadvantage 
to be addressed in a more systemic and better coordinated manner. Such an 
approach would presumably be more consonant with the insight that socio-
economic deprivation is, in many cases, deeply embedded in social structures 
and cultural prejudices, and better able to address it than the determination of 
the validity of individual complaints on an ad hoc basis.
66
The literature on political rights in a dominant party democracy is, similarly, 
concerned that an approach which focuses primarily on individual rights, 
could serve to blind judges to the pathologies resulting from the imperfections 
and failures of the political system. However, it would be a mistake to treat 
rights and structures as separate, unrelated entities, as the literature sometimes 
appears to do, or to suggest that adjudication should eschew rights analysis in 
favour of analyses of the institutional architecture created by the Constitution. 
The point should, rather, be that rights and democratic structures serve the 
same constitutional values and are interdependent and mutually reinforcing.
67
 
Not only is the realisation of political rights conditional on the enforcement 
of the Constitution’s institutional provisions, but rights adjudication could 
serve to bolster democratic institutions and help overcome the structural 
impediments to their effective functioning.
65 
33-34.
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Consider, for example, the German Federal Constitutional Court’s use of 
the principle of the equality of the vote to interrogate measures that result in 
the distortion of the representation of different political parties. Even though 
the court, in 1957, upheld the constitutionality of the rule that a political party 
must achieve a minimum threshold of 5% in national elections to gain seats in 
Parliament,
68
 a 1990 judgment ruled that the application of the threshold to the 
whole of Germany in the first election after unification was unconstitutional. 
The reason was that it unduly favoured parties that were active only in 
West Germany over ones that were active only in East Germany. Given the 
short span of time within which those parties had to compete for votes in 
the other territory, the rule violated the equality of the vote and the equality 
of opportunity of political parties.
69
 The German Constitutional Court 
relied on the equality of suffrage to set limits to electoral rules that skew 
the proportionality of representation or stifle party-political competition in 
other contexts as well. For example, the court has stressed that the equality 
of the vote requires constituencies to have relatively equal populations.
70
 It 
has also held that electoral rules which could result in a loss of seats for a 
party receiving more second-ballot votes
71
 were unconstitutional.
72
 These 
judgments are clear that any deviation from the equal value that should be 
accorded to every vote must be justified by compelling reasons. The principle 
of equal voting rights has thus been used to overcome the considerable degree 
of deference that is normally paid to the legislature in regulating the electoral 
system, given that article 38(3) of the Basic Law leaves the choice of a system 
of representation to Parliament.
A 2013 judgment of the African Court on Human and People’s Rights 
similarly illustrates the interdependence of rights and democratic structures, 
and the capacity of rights discourse to challenge legal rules that have a 
corrosive effect on the basic structures and premises of the democratic system. 
The court held that the prohibition of independent candidates in presidential, 
parliamentary, and local government elections violated the right to participate 
freely in the government of one’s country, as well as the rights to freedom of 
association, equality and freedom from discrimination, as guaranteed under 
the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.
73
The problem with UDM is precisely the Court’s failure to come to terms 
with the interconnectedness of rights and democratic structures. The judgment 
fails to see how background rules that do not directly affect the electorate’s 
ability to vote, can nevertheless distort the outcome of the vote and undermine 
democratic accountability. It divorces the right to vote from institutional issues 
relating to the system of representation and the role of opposition parties, and 
68 
BVerfGE 6, 84 94-95 (1957), with reference to BVerfGE 1, 208 256 (1952).
69 
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assumes that the ruling party’s dominance has no bearing on either the vote or 
the democratic structures underpinning it.
3 2 Principle and pragmatism
Theunis Roux has offered a different explanation for the apparent 
anomalies characterising the court’s voting rights jurisprudence. Roux 
wrote in 2006 that UDM should not be seen as a renunciation of the deep 
principle of democracy embodied in the constitutional text, and articulated 
in some of the Constitutional Court’s decisions.
74
 Rather, it relies on “a 
countervailing principle, extrinsic to FC s 1(d)”, which holds that “where the 
Final Constitution does not clearly prescribe a particular model, the judiciary 
should defer to the legislature in politically sensitive cases concerning the 
design of the electoral system”.
75
 Put differently, judgments like NNP and 
UDM amount to a pragmatic concession to the court’s vulnerable institutional 
position.
76
 
Roux has further developed this frame of analysis in subsequent writings. 
In a recent book, he argues that the Chaskalson Court’s attempts to secure its 
institutional independence rested, on the one hand, on a commitment to legally 
principled adjudication, and on the other hand, on a set of strategies designed 
to underplay the political nature of its role and to “manage its relationship with 
the ANC”.
77
 The formalism and deference of the NNP and UDM judgments 
are directly attributable to the political pressures facing the court, and are 
best seen as adjudicative strategies designed to protect the court’s institutional 
position. Both applications challenged the ANC’s electoral dominance, and 
adverse findings might have endangered the court’s relationship with the 
ruling party.
78
 But even though the court’s restraint is understandable from 
this perspective, Roux criticises these judgments for failing to carve out a 
meaningful role for the court in “opening up South Africa’s dominant party 
democracy”.
79
 They not only represent a problematic departure from the 
court’s general commitment to principled decision making, but are also 
questionable as a matter of judicial politics. 
Roux’s analysis thus relies on a closely related set of distinctions. On the one 
hand, the court’s general approach, as enunciated in judgments like August 
and NICRO, is based on principle and embodies a deep understanding of 
democracy. On the other hand, judgments like NNP and UDM, which appear 
to be underpinned by a shallow conception of democracy, are exceptions 
to the general rule, which can only be explained with reference to strategic 
considerations. 
74 
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Assuming that the court’s voting rights judgments provide a big enough 
sample to warrant conclusions about what constitutes the general rule and 
what amounts to exceptions, it could nevertheless be asked whether Roux 
does not overstate the divide between August and NICRO, on the one hand, 
and NNP and UDM, on the other. Can August and NICRO truly be said to 
stand for a rigorous voting rights jurisprudence, given the gap between the 
broad democratic vision that they articulate and the narrowness of the court’s 
actual reasoning? In addition, can the differences between the facts of these 
cases not explain the different outcomes, and provide clues as to the limits 
of the court’s interpretive approach? As Roux recognises, NNP differed 
from the prisoners’ voting rights cases in that it involved not the express 
disenfranchisement of a discrete category of voters, but a regulation aimed 
at the facilitation of the right to vote which happened to make it difficult or 
impossible for some citizens to cast their ballots.
80
 The laws in UDM, on the 
other hand, had no bearing on who was allowed to vote, but potentially diluted 
the value of the vote and the accountability that democratic representatives 
owe to the electorate. In view of these differences, it seems possible that there 
is something about the court’s interpretation of the right to vote which makes 
it more amenable to intervene in cases like August and NICRO and less so in 
ones like NNP and UDM.
Secondly, there are a number of doctrinal difficulties involved in extending 
the reasoning in August and NICRO in order to provide relief in cases in which 
disenfranchisement results from an ostensibly neutral and rational regulatory 
scheme. As Roux indicates, a less deferential approach in NNP would have 
required the court either to import a reasonableness standard into the inquiry 
whether the right to vote had been infringed, as O’Regan J had done, or to 
treat any regulation of the electoral process which imposes obligations on 
voters as a limitation of the right to vote which triggers the reasonableness 
test in terms of the general limitation clause in section 36.
81
 The problem with 
the first approach is that it sits uneasily with the structure of Bill-of-Rights 
litigation, which entails a two-stage approach which first enquires into the 
scope and ambit of the right(s) in question and then, once a limitation has 
been found, considers whether it is reasonable and justifiable. Although the 
court has incorporated a reasonableness standard into the interpretation of 
some rights, it has done so only in cases in which the text of the Constitution 
itself prompts a blurring of the distinction between the first and second stage, 
by expressly qualifying the scope of the right with reference to open-ended 
standards such as reasonableness.
82
 The relaxation of the demarcation of the 
two stages might indeed have been preferable in view of the fundamental 
importance of the right to vote. Even so, it is understandable that the court, 
80 
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given its general caution and somewhat conservative jurisprudential leanings, 
was loath to relax it in the absence of an express textual invitation to do so.
83
 
The second alternative is not without problems either. To treat any 
regulation of the electoral process, or any regulation imposing obligations 
on voters as a limitation of the right to vote, would effectively collapse the 
two-stage inquiry into the second stage, which focuses on the justifiability of 
the limitation. Again, this approach might be preferable to one which shields 
regulatory measures from reasonableness analysis, even where they place real 
obstacles in the way of exercising the vote. However, in the absence of a test 
to distinguish limitations from regulatory measures that do not restrict the 
right to vote, there is a danger that the courts may water down the limitations 
standard in view of the large number of measures that could come before 
them, and in recognition of Parliament’s constitutionally mandated role in 
regulating elections. 
These doctrinal obstacles are not insurmountable. Courts are free to adapt 
doctrine to changing circumstances, to accommodate it to shifting contexts 
and to develop it in line with constitutional values. However, the question 
is whether the Constitutional Court’s voting rights jurisprudence provides 
an adequate normative framework to justify and guide such deviations from 
its general approach to fundamental rights adjudication. Do judgments like 
August and NICRO rest upon a sufficiently deep understanding of democracy 
to be able to do that? Or could it be that there is more continuity between these 
judgments and the ones in NNP and UDM than is commonly assumed?
3 3 Dignity and democracy
The first two explanations of the inconsistencies in the Constitutional 
Court’s voting rights jurisprudence beg the question whether the court’s 
basic approach to voting rights has contributed to the disappointing outcomes 
in NNP and UDM: the first, because it overstates the distinction between 
rights and structures; and the second, because it assumes that any such 
inconsistencies must result from extra-legal considerations. In this section I 
consider a third explanation, which ascribes these inconsistencies to the role 
of human dignity in the court’s voting rights jurisprudence. This explanation 
rests on three premises: that dignity plays an important, even decisive, role in 
the court’s interpretation of political rights; that in some contexts, the court’s 
dignity-based analysis of political rights promotes an inclusive, egalitarian 
and participatory vision of democracy and an active notion of citizenship; 
and that in others, it is conducive to a more restrained role for the judiciary 
vis-à-vis the democratic process.
83 
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Sachs J’s pronouncement in August on the relationship between dignity 
and the right to vote has been quoted with approval in other cases in which 
restrictions on the vote have been invalidated.
84
 The court in these cases did 
not rely exclusively on the value of human dignity in interpreting the right to 
vote or in assessing its importance in relation to countervailing considerations, 
but also referred to the importance of the right to vote to the constitutional 
value of democracy. For instance, in the Richter case, O’Regan J emphasised, 
in addition to the symbolic value of the vote as stressed by Sachs J in August, 
“the deep, democratic value that lies in a citizenry conscious of its civic 
responsibilities and willing to take the trouble that exercising the right to vote 
entails”.
85
 Here, dignity and democracy are treated as complementary and 
mutually reinforcing values. 
It could nevertheless be argued that it is dignity – that is, the equal dignity 
of members of the political community – that does the bulk of the work in the 
court’s voting rights analysis. In the first place, the cases in which a violation 
of the right to vote was found, all concerned instances in which an identifiable 
social group – prisoners, on two separate occasions, and non-resident South 
African citizens – were deprived of the vote. These cases resemble those 
equality cases in which differential treatment was found to impair the equal 
dignity of the groups concerned, and consequently amounted to unfair 
discrimination. In line with those cases, the court balked at the suggestion 
that prisoners had disqualified themselves from the right to vote,86 rejected 
measures which lumped together all persons who had been imprisoned 
without the option of a fine,87 and was at pains to point out that the fact that 
citizens are working abroad does not mean that they have relinquished their 
commitment to South Africa.
88
 The court, it seems, has little sympathy for 
measures which rest on crude generalisations that label entire social groups 
or categories of persons as lacking in civic commitment or as unworthy of 
exercising the right to vote. Such measures, in the view of the court, are at 
odds with a constitutional vision in which all citizens have equal dignity,
89
 
and in which prejudice and social stereotypes cannot justify the limitation of 
their rights.
90
Secondly, the instances in which a limitation of section 19(3) was not 
found, did not involve the direct exclusion of categories of persons from 
the ballot, but concerned allegations that regulatory measures aimed at 
84 
See Minister of Home Affairs v NICRO 2004 5 BCLR 445 (CC) para 28; and Richter v Minister of Home 
Affairs 2009 3 SA 615 (CC) para 52.
85 
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facilitating the electoral process infringed the right to vote,
91
 or that features 
of the representative system diluted the link between voters and their 
representatives.
92
 In these cases, the court showed considerable deference to 
the decisions of Parliament. This, too, seems consistent with a dignitarian 
framework – since the laws in question did not exclude or discriminate against 
distinct social groups, they did not trigger the strict scrutiny reserved for 
measures that strike at the heart of the constitutional values of human dignity 
and equality.
93
 
Thirdly, much of the court’s voting rights jurisprudence turns on the 
distinction between measures which make it impossible or unduly difficult 
for citizens to vote and those requiring them only to “take reasonable steps in 
pursuit of that right”.
94
 In the court’s view, the disenfranchisement of prisoners 
clearly fell into the first category. As the court pointed out in NICRO: 
“Prisoners are prevented from voting by the provisions of the Electoral Act and by the action that the 
State has taken against them. Their position cannot be compared to people whose freedom has not 
been curtailed by law and who require special arrangements to be made for them to be able to vote.”
95
The same applied to voters who were abroad on voting day, and who 
could not be reasonably expected to “travel thousands of kilometres across 
the globe to be in their voting district on voting day”.
96
 A number of other 
measures were, however, found only to require voters to take reasonable steps. 
These include the requirement in NNP of a bar-coded identity document as a 
prerequisite for voting,
97
 and the requirement in Richter that voters who will 
be abroad on the day of election notify the Chief Electoral Officer of their 
intention to bring out a special vote within 15 days of the date of proclamation 
of the election.
98
 
The distinction is in accordance with the court’s basic dignitarian 
framework. It is widely held, in accordance with Kant’s second formulation 
of the categorical imperative, that dignity proscribes the treatment of 
individuals as mere means to an end or as disposable objects of state power.
99
 
In terms of this approach, measures which impose reasonable obligations on 
individuals that respect their moral agency, are not seen to be inconsistent 
91 
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with the inherent dignity and worth of the human person.
100
 Accordingly, the 
imposition of reasonable civic duties on potential voters neither reduces them 
to passive objects of government power, nor denies their civic responsibility or 
choice. It is, however, a different matter where the measures in question make 
it impossible or exceedingly difficult for them to vote. Besides restricting their 
participation in political life, such measures signal that they are less worthy 
of civic consideration and less capable of the responsible exercise of political 
freedom.
Finally, despite references to the importance of the vote to the democratic 
society envisaged by the Constitution, the court has largely failed to indicate 
how the value of democracy sheds light on the meaning of section 19(3). 
This is evident from the UDM Court’s failure to give meaningful content to 
the value of democracy and to explore the link between democratic rights 
and structures. It is also noticeable in the Richter case: even though the 
court stressed the link between the exercise of the vote and the idea that the 
government derives its power from and remains subject to the will of the 
people,
101 it did not even begin to address questions relating to the definition 
of “the people” or the link between voting rights and residence. 
It appears plausible, in view of the above analysis, to claim that the apparent 
inconsistencies in the Constitutional Court’s voting rights jurisprudence have 
something to do with the emphasis it has placed on human dignity. In the first 
place, the Court’s dignity-based approach has resulted in a fairly rigorous form 
of scrutiny whenever discrete classes of voters are disenfranchised. Where, 
on the other hand, restrictions of the vote arise from regulatory measures 
aimed at facilitating the exercise of the vote, or from the rules that regulate 
the powers of representatives and their links to the electorate, the court has 
shown a far greater degree of restraint. This is perhaps not surprising: in other 
contexts, too, it has been noted that a dignity-based approach tends to be more 
alert to direct rights violations which clearly deny the autonomy and worth 
of the human person or signal that a class of persons is less worthy of equal 
consideration, than to infringements which occur at the interface of supposedly 
neutral legal rules and cultural, material and structural impediments to the 
equal enjoyment of rights.
102
 
Secondly, the distinction between measures which make it impossible 
or unduly difficult for some to vote and those that impose reasonable civic 
obligations has proved problematic. At one level, it seems to be in accordance 
with our basic intuitions about dignity and moral agency; at another, it tends 
to deflect attention away from the state’s positive duty, in terms of section 
100 
For instance, in BVerfGE 88, 203 281 (1993) the German Federal Constitutional Court held that a 
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7(2), to protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.103 In a 
society plagued by high levels of poverty and inequality, there is a danger 
that courts may base their assessment of what amounts to reasonable civic 
obligations on assumptions derived from the lived experience of the middle 
class, and may consequently understate the difficulties experienced by poor, 
illiterate and rural voters. Again, the focus on the dignity and personhood of 
individual voters appears to shift the attention away from the ways in which 
seemingly neutral laws reproduce the political disempowerment of poor and 
marginalised groups and communities.
104
 
3 4 Concluding remarks
The preceding analysis suggests that the Constitutional Court’s focus on 
human dignity, coupled with its failure to give meaningful content to the value 
of democracy in its voting rights judgments, can help explain the apparent 
anomalies in the court’s jurisprudence. The analysis draws on the distinction, 
made by Choudhry and Issacharoff, between rights and structures. However, 
it resists a hierarchical approach which prioritises structures over rights, 
and insists instead on their interdependence. The problem in cases like NNP 
and UDM is not that the court engages in rights analysis, but rather that its 
analyses are not sensitive enough to social and political structures of power 
and domination, and how they impact on the normative ideals embodied in 
rights discourse. 
The analysis also does not deny the importance of institutional 
considerations, such as the Constitutional Court’s attempts to protect its own 
institutional position, as analysed by Roux. It is likely that the court’s deference 
in NNP and UDM arose, in part, from concerns about its institutional position. 
However, that is not to say that these were the only considerations influencing 
the court, or that the court saw these cases in terms of a stark choice between 
103 
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actions than from omissions, at least in cases which involve a direct conflict between the state’s duties 
to respect and to protect fundamental rights. See for example BVerfGE 115, 118 (2006), in which the 
German Federal Constitutional Court invalidated legislation which authorised the security forces to shoot 
down an aircraft which was to be used to destroy human life. The court refused to balance the dignity of 
innocent victims against the lives of others who might be saved in the process, and thus privileged the 
state’s negative duty to respect dignity over its positive duty to protect it. See Ackermann Human Dignity: 
Lodestar for Equality in South Africa 119-126 for a defence of this approach.
104 
It could be argued that NNP rested on a flawed application of the distinction between regulatory measures 
and outright deprivations of the right to vote, as the requirement of a bar-coded identity document made 
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systemic inequality and structural power to deepen and reproduce social exclusion. 
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pragmatism and principle. It seems likely that its responses were shaped not 
only by concerns about its institutional position, but also by its understanding 
of the relevant normative and doctrinal issues and the extent of the threat that 
the laws in question posed to its constitutional vision of democracy. If this is 
correct, it seems plausible to suggest that, whatever other reasons the court 
may have had to tread lightly, its dignity-based understanding of voting rights 
played an important role in enabling it to identify NNP as a case of regulation 
rather than deprivation, and UDM as a matter of legislative choice over the 
particulars of the representative system, rather than a dispute which goes to 
the heart of democratic accountability. 
A final qualification is that my critique of the Constitutional Court’s 
dignity-based approach refers to the specific sense in which the court has 
used the term “dignity” in its voting rights jurisprudence, and should not be 
taken to imply that dignity has no place in our understanding of the right to 
vote. Dignity is a contested concept, and everything depends on how we flesh 
out its meaning and articulate it with other democratic values.
105
 
4 Reconsidering Sachs J’s dictum in August
Sachs J’s dictum in August, in which he grounded the universality of the 
right to vote in dignity, equality and citizenship, is often cited in case law and 
academic writings. It has nevertheless been under-analysed in the literature, 
presumably because it is thought to amount to little more than a rhetorical 
flourish. However, the above analysis suggests that it does more work than is 
commonly assumed. If the likelihood of judicial intervention or restraint is 
indeed tied to a particular measure’s impact on the dignity of those affected, 
it is important to come to terms with the court’s understanding of dignity in 
this context, and of its articulation with the values of democracy, citizenship, 
equality and nationhood.
There is a second reason for taking this passage seriously. It is possible that 
the democratic vision that it articulates, has greater transformative potential 
than would appear from the actual holding itself or from cases in which it has 
been cited. This may be the result of the gap between the breadth of Sachs J’s 
vision and the narrowness of the holding in August. It may also have to do with 
the way in which Sachs J’s rich articulation of constitutional values has been 
reduced in subsequent cases to a one-dimensional, formulaic understanding. 
The possibility that there is something about the dictum itself which 
undermines its own transformative potential, should also not be discounted. 
105 
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staatlichen Gemeinschaft” in J Isensee & P Kirchhof (eds) Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland Bd II: Verfassungsstaat 3 ed (2004) 317 350-353; S Woolman “Dignity” in S Woolman, M 
Bishop & J Brickhill (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2005) 36-12 – 36-14; Woolman 
& Botha “Limitations” in CLOSA 34-113 – 34-127 and H Botha “Human Dignity in Comparative 
Perspective” (2009) 20 Stell LR 171 192-194, 214-215.
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4 1 Dignity, equality and citizenship
Subsequent judgments have focused, for the main part, on Sachs J’s 
description of the vote as a badge of dignity and personhood, and have taken 
this to mean that universal adult suffrage plays an important symbolic role in 
signalling the equal dignity and worth of all South Africans, irrespective of 
their race, social class, economic status or conformity to dominant norms of 
behaviour.
106
 This is undoubtedly an important dimension of the right to vote.
107
 
However, it could be asked whether this emphasis on the symbolic value of 
the vote does not miss something important about dignity’s relationship with 
the equality and universality of democratic citizenship, as alluded to by Sachs 
J. Is the vote to be seen simply as a ritual enactment, performed every five 
years, of the equal dignity of all citizens? Is it thus divorced from other forms 
of participation in the life of the polity? In addition, must we take his dictum 
simply to refer to the strict formal equality of citizens? Does political equality 
not also require a sensitivity to, and political mobilisation around the ways 
in which material and other forms of disadvantage skew political power and 
distort the equal representation of all citizens? 
The work of Hannah Arendt provides a useful vantage point for a 
consideration of these questions. Arendt had no place in her thought for 
abstract notions of human dignity. Commenting on the desperate situation of 
refugees and stateless persons in the wake of two World Wars and the radical 
restructuring of the political landscape in Europe, she wrote that individuals 
who no longer belonged to an organised human community, and who 
could for that reason only rely on their abstract and general humanity, soon 
discovered that “[t]he world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness 
of being human”.
108
 Deprived of “a place in the world which makes opinions 
significant and actions effective”,109 they were relegated to a sphere of mere 
existence – outside the law, outside politics and outside humanity. For her, 
rights – whether civil rights or human rights – could only be guaranteed 
through membership in a political community. Similarly, human dignity 
becomes a meaningless abstraction when it is uncoupled from political 
membership. The concrete, embedded dignity of citizens is the only form of 
dignity worth talking about.
110
 
In Arendt’s thought, equality is also closely related to membership in a 
political community. Arendt considered the private realm as the sphere in 
which the natural inequalities between individuals loom large. The public 
realm, on the other hand, is the sphere of human artifice, in which citizenship 
106 
Minister of Home Affairs v NICRO 2004 5 BCLR 445 (CC) para 28; Richter v Minister of Home Affairs 
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On the distinction between the abstract dignity of humanity and the dignity of citizens, see F du Bois 
“Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens” in AJ Barnard-Naudé, D Cornell & F du Bois (eds) Dignity, 
Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order: The Critical Jurisprudence of Laurie Ackermann 
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provides a mask which enables individuals to be judged on the basis of their 
words and actions, rather than their natural differences. It is here that they 
can create a common world and reveal their singularity through public action. 
The equality on which the public sphere rests, can never be “natural”, but 
can only arise from human organisation. It comes about as a result of our 
decision, as citizens, “to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights”,
111
 and 
is contingent on the existence of public institutions which provide a space for 
such interaction. 
Arendt’s views on the dignity and equality inherent in citizenship provide 
important clues to the meaning of Sachs J’s dictum in August. The idea that 
citizenship abstracts away from the natural differences and inequalities 
between people, resonates powerfully with Sachs J’s emphasis on the way 
in which universal adult suffrage transcends disparities of wealth and power. 
Moreover, her belief that membership in a political community enables 
citizens to disclose their uniqueness through public speech and action, has an 
affinity with the participatory strands in the court’s jurisprudence. But, even 
though Arendt can certainly not be criticised for a shallow understanding of 
democracy which reduces political rights to the occasional exercise of the vote, 
she is vulnerable to the charge that her political thought forecloses meaningful 
responses to the pernicious effects of private inequality in the public-political 
realm. In seeking to protect the integrity of the public sphere by fencing it off 
from private need, Arendt severely restricted the range of issues that can be 
subjected to democratic decision-making. Critics have pointed out that the 
boundary between the public and private spheres is porous and constantly 
shifting, and is the subject of countless democratic struggles which seek to 
politicise matters that used to be seen as falling squarely within the private 
sphere. Because she defined the political with reference to a pre-existing 
border, Arendt could not account for the transformative potential inherent in 
struggles that place that very border in question. As a result, she was unable to 
theorise the potential of political equality to challenge inequities in the social 
sphere.
112
In her book titled Genealogies of Citizenship, the American sociologist 
Margaret Somers relies on Arendt to argue that rights are not simply 
individual possessions, but public goods that “can only be sustained by an 
alliance of public power, political membership, and social practices of equal 
moral recognition”.
113
 Drawing inter alia on TH Marshall’s classical typology 
of citizenship and his insistence that social rights play an important role in 
enabling citizens to participate on an equal footing in social, cultural and 
political life,
114
 she develops a theory to account for the relationship between 
111 
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citizenship and socio-economic inequality. In a departure from mainstream 
approaches, which understand citizenship in terms of the relation between the 
state and individual citizens, she conceives it in terms of the triadic relation 
between the state, market and civil society. On this understanding, civil 
society is the sphere in which citizenship and social solidarity are nurtured. 
Moreover, it is a site of contestation which has an important role to play in 
resisting both state repression and the extension of the inequalities of the 
market into other spheres of human activity.
115
 
However, civil society is fragile, and its egalitarian and socially inclusive 
ethos can easily make way for a darker, exclusionary and repressive side. This 
is particularly the case when the balance of power among the state, market 
and civil society is distorted. According to Somers, this has occurred in the 
United States during the past decades, where citizenship has increasingly 
been subjected to the contractual logic of the market. Under the pressure of 
market fundamentalism, the rights of citizens have become conditional on 
their ability to exchange something of equal value, thus enabling the state 
to shirk its responsibility by shifting the blame for social problems onto the 
individuals themselves. This amounts to a repudiation of the egalitarian, 
inclusive and universalistic assumptions underlying citizenship.
116
 Somers 
argues that the state’s hopelessly inadequate response to the trauma inflicted 
on the residents of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina, confirmed that market 
fundamentalism had deprived the poor of meaningful social and political 
membership. The contractualisation of citizenship, as evidenced inter alia by 
the substitution, through the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities 
Reconciliation Act of 1996, of workfare for welfare, had reduced the poor to 
internally stateless persons, who had to fend for themselves but lacked the 
resources to do so. She writes:
“Market fundamentalism thus grafted its universalistic discourse onto the substance of a society 
that was still deeply segregated and rent with historically inflicted inequalities. … [T]he discursive 
triumph of market fundamentalism has the effect of freezing in place the identity-based inequalities 
and historical exclusions, and then worsening them through deepening market-based inequalities. 
The result is nothing less than total social and political exclusion from membership in the human 
community.”
117
Somers’ reconceptualization of Arendt’s notion of the right to have 
rights to refer not only to “recognition, inclusion, and membership” in the 
political community, but also in civil society,
118
 allows for a richer analysis 
of the relation between citizenship, dignity and equality. Breaking with the 
dichotomy between the public and private spheres which is so central to 
Arendt’s thought and differentiating civil society from both the state and the 
115 
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market, she grounds citizenship in a balance between these three institutions. 
She is thus able to shift the focus away from the formal status of citizenship, 
and to draw attention instead to the overlap between social exclusion and 
political disenfranchisement. Somers recognises that it is not only the external 
boundaries separating citizens from non-citizens that place some persons 
beyond the protection of the law. There are internal exclusions, too, which 
deprive certain classes of nationals from actual citizenship. These internal 
borders track different, overlapping forms of disadvantage, based inter alia on 
race, class, unemployment, gender and non-conformity to mainstream norms 
and roles, which are deepened as a result of the marketization of citizenship. 
In effect, they exclude some from social membership, sever them from the 
public sphere and deprive them of the actual enjoyment of rights, even where 
they retain formal membership of the political community.
119
 
How does Sachs J’s articulation in August of the importance of the vote 
stand up to this? His references to human dignity, equality and the univer-
sality of the vote certainly capture the idea that citizenship serves to integrate 
individuals into an inclusive community based on equal recognition.
120
 More-
over, his allusion to disparities of wealth and power signals an awareness of 
historical patterns of social exclusion and disadvantage. Based on this, it does 
not seem fanciful to expect the court to be exacting in its demand for the 
justification of measures that add the insult of political disenfranchisement 
to the injury of social marginalisation. An argument could even be made that 
such restrictions should never be allowed, as they effectively remove the last 
remaining vestiges of the political and social membership of those affected, 
and thus deprive them of the very basis of their rights.
121
 
But of course, the court did not go nearly that far. In August and in NICRO, 
it held open the possibility that the disenfranchisement of prisoners could 
pass constitutional muster, provided that it was proportionate to a sufficiently 
important state goal. Moreover, it is not clear whether Sachs J’s reference to 
disparities of wealth and power was truly meant to incorporate a substantive 
vision of equality into the court’s voting rights analysis. His dictum could 
be read simply to refer to the formal equality of citizenship, which plays 
an important symbolic role in integrating the poor and marginalised into 
the community of citizens, but does not require a probing analysis of the 
intersection between disenfranchisement and social exclusion. This reading 
seems to be confirmed by the judgment in NNP, which was delivered a 
mere twelve days after the one in August, and the one in Democratic Party 
119 
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v Minister of Home Affairs,
122
 in which the court rejected the argument that 
the same voter identification requirement amounted to unfair discrimination. 
Also missing from Sachs J’s judgment is engagement with the agonistic 
dimension of citizenship. For Somers, citizenship is not only a means of social 
and political integration. It is also a site of contestation, which depends for its 
survival on its capacity to mobilise resistance against both state repression and 
boundary transgressions by the market. The disenfranchisement of categories 
of people that are deemed socially redundant narrows down the scope for 
contestation, by silencing voices and depriving the political community of 
“oppositional counter-publics”
123
 that can mobilise such resistance.
O’Regan J’s dissenting judgment in NNP comes closest to capturing 
the egalitarian and agonistic dimensions of the right to vote. She expressly 
recognises the link between the right to vote and the exercise of political 
power, when stating that:
“The right to vote is more than a symbol of our common citizenship, it is also an instrument for 
determining who should exercise political power in our society.”
124
 
By this, she does not simply mean that power is derived from the people, or 
that the exercise of public power is legitimated through elections. Rather, she 
emphasises that a denial of the vote leads, in many cases, to the complete denial 
of fundamental human rights. She refers to apartheid South Africa, where the 
denial of the vote to black people entrenched white political power, which 
“was used systematically to further the interests of white South Africans and 
to disadvantage black South Africans”.
125
 She also points out, with reference 
to a decision of the United States Supreme Court, that “the right to vote is 
‘preservative of all rights’.
126
 The right to vote, on this understanding, is 
both the basis of other rights and a mechanism through which the poor and 
marginalised can resist social exclusion. For this reason, a deferential standard 
of review, such as rationality, is not an appropriate baseline for determining 
whether the regulation of the electoral process infringes the right to vote.
4 2 Dignity, citizenship and nationality
Sachs J’s dictum in August is replete with references to the South African 
nation. It refers, inter alia, to the importance of the vote for “the accomplishment 
of an all-embracing nationhood” and in signalling that, despite differences 
in class and status, “we all belong to the same democratic South African 
nation”.
127
 There is nothing sinister about these references. They are meant 
to emphasise the shift away from the apartheid order’s exclusionary laws and 
practices, which reduced the majority of the population to statelessness, to 
the inclusivity of the new constitutional order, which has redrawn the bounds 
122 
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of membership and belonging. And yet, the passage is perhaps too quick to 
identify citizenship with, and tie voting rights to, nationality. Could it be that 
the court’s apparent conflation in Richter of citizenship with nationality is 
rooted in Sachs J’s dictum in August? 
Historically, the distinction between citizenship and nationality pointed to 
a fundamental divide between the active status of citizenship and the passive 
status of subjects whose submission to the law had to be secured, but who 
were excluded from active participation in the life of the nation. Nationality, 
which designated a passive status, extended to all who had a close relationship 
with the nation state, usually by virtue of birth or some other criteria which 
established ties of trust and belonging. Citizenship, by contrast, conveyed an 
active status: only citizens were full members of the polity and were entitled 
to participate in political decision-making.
128
 The twentieth century saw 
a growing convergence of the two, as a result of the extension of suffrage 
to women, the poor and, in countries where citizenship used to be racially 
qualified, members of previously excluded racial groups. However, in recent 
years the distinction has reasserted itself in different, often contradictory 
ways. 
In the first place, many of the rights traditionally associated with citizenship 
have been extended to nationals of other countries. Foreign nationals are 
guaranteed civil rights and often enjoy social rights and benefits. Moreover, the 
right to vote is increasingly granted to non-nationals based on their residency, 
at least at some levels of government (most often local government).
129
 
Citizenship has thus been “disaggregated” into different components, with 
the result that the legal position of certain foreign nationals has come to 
approximate that of citizen-nationals. These developments resulted from a 
variety of pressures, including the growing mobility of people across national 
boundaries, political attempts to integrate foreign nationals into society, and 
supranational processes of regional integration.
130
 As Benhabib points out, 
these changes respond to the growing gap between, on the one hand, “the ‘ideal 
typical’ model of citizenship in the modern nation-state”, which presupposes a 
“unity of residency, administrative subjection, democratic participation, and 
cultural membership”,
131
 and, on the other, changes in demographics and the 
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nature of political authority, which render that model out of sync with the 
actual conditions obtaining today. 
Secondly, nationalist understandings of membership and belonging, which 
ground citizenship not in a legal status defined in terms of civil rights, but 
in membership in a community founded on a particular ethnic or cultural 
identity, have reappeared. As Habermas notes, appeals to such an organic, 
pre-political and naturalistic conception of the nation and identity-based 
understanding of citizenship have historically been powerful vehicles for the 
promotion of discrimination within and aggression across the boundaries 
of the nation state.
132
 This is still the case today. Somers argues that, in the 
contemporary United States, nationalist and ethnic notions of belonging have 
to compensate for the exclusion of significant sections of the nation from 
real social and political membership. In many cases, the internally stateless 
“have become nationalist patriots – a symbolic garb that compensates for 
the loss of rights by cultural and symbolic identification”133 with “a militant 
security-driven nationalism” and “a radical free-market ideology”.
134
 In South 
Africa, too, nationalist and culturalist notions of belonging are vying with the 
universal language of human and civil rights, as a means of integrating the 
poor and marginalised into the national community.
135
A too ready identification of nationality with citizenship overlooks the 
incongruence between residency, subjection to government power, democratic 
rights and cultural membership, and risks appropriating the vocabulary 
of identity-based notions of national belonging. But let us assume, for the 
moment, that Sachs J’s references to nationhood were not meant to collapse 
the citizenry onto an exclusive understanding of the South African nation. 
Couldn’t it be argued that his articulation of the vote with dignity might pave 
the way for the extension of voting rights to non-nationals who have made 
South Africa their home and are subject to the state’s authority? Doesn’t 
it follow from the injunction that persons should never be treated as mere 
objects, that they should have a say in how they are governed? Doesn’t human 
dignity require the state to narrow the gap between those who are governed by 
the laws, and those with the right to elect the lawmakers? 
These arguments were made before the Constitutional Court of Bremen, 
a city state in Germany, in a case concerning the constitutionality of a 
132 
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provincial Bill.
136
 The Bill would have extended the right to vote in elections 
for the state (provincial) legislature to residents who were citizens of other 
member states of the European Union (EU). In addition, it would have granted 
the right to vote in local council elections to residents who were citizens of 
third-country states (that is countries outside the EU). Previous attempts 
on the part of provincial legislatures to extend the vote to non-citizens had 
been unsuccessful. Most notably, in 1990 the Federal Constitutional Court 
invalidated a law of the provincial legislature of Schleswig-Holstein which 
sought to extend the vote in local government elections to citizens of certain 
countries who had been resident in Germany for at least five years. The court 
held that the law was inconsistent with article 28(1) of the German Basic Law 
which, read with article 20(2), restricted the vote to German nationals, as 
defined in article 116(1).137 However, the Bremen provincial legislature argued 
that this judgment had been overtaken by an amendment to article 28(1) of 
the Basic Law which, in accordance with the Treaty of Maastricht, extended 
the right to vote and to be elected in local government elections to citizens of 
other member states of the EU. As a result, the province was free to develop 
a more inclusive interpretation of the concept of “the people”, which sought 
to address democratic concerns arising from the growing gap between the 
electorate and those who are subject to the law, and which was more in line 
with the constitutional precept of human dignity, with its emphasis on the 
right of individuals to have a say in decisions affecting them.
The court rejected these arguments by a majority of six to one. Despite the 
fact that the provincial Constitution does not expressly restrict “the people” 
to German nationals, but stipulates that all state authority shall be exercised 
by the residents of Bremen who are entitled to vote, the court held that this 
provision had to be interpreted in line with the Basic Law’s conception of 
“the people”, which comprises only German nationals. The constitutional 
amendment which extended the right to vote in local government elections 
to citizens of other member states of the EU did not change the underlying 
principle, but only made a limited exception in order to ensure compliance 
with the Maastricht Treaty. A further extension of the vote could only be 
achieved through another constitutional amendment, or through changes to 
the laws governing the acquisition of German nationality. 
In her minority judgment, Sacksofsky J rejected the idea that the consti-
tutional amendment of 1992 amounted to a limited exception which had no 
bearing on the general principle that “the people” comprised only German 
nationals. She held that the provinces were not barred from extending voting 
rights to foreign nationals, in an attempt to bring electoral law more closely 
in line with the democratic principle that everyone who is affected by state 
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power, should have the opportunity to take part in the democratic process. She 
added, with reference to the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court in 
the Lisbon Treaty Case,
138
 that the same principle was also underpinned by 
human dignity. The only constraint was the requirement, contained in article 
28(1) of the Basic Law, that representatives must be elected through general, 
direct, free, equal and secret elections.
This case highlights the potential of a dignity-based understanding of 
political rights to hold open the possibility of more inclusive democratic 
imaginations. The articulation of the idea that human dignity demands that 
every person should be treated as an autonomous subject, rather than a mere 
object, with the democratic principle that people who are subject to state 
power, should have a say in how that power is exercised, seems particularly 
promising. At the same time, the judgment illustrates the difficulties facing 
such a democratic politics in a constitutional system in which democratic 
citizenship has traditionally been closely aligned to nationality.
139
5 Concluding remarks
This article asks whether the fluctuations in the Constitutional Court’s 
voting rights jurisprudence between deep and shallow understandings of 
democracy and between interventionist and deferential modes of adjudication 
may have something to do with the court’s substantive understanding of the 
right to vote. It argues that the court’s focus on human dignity, coupled with 
its failure to give meaningful content to the value of democracy within the 
voting rights context, has given rise to fairly rigorous forms of scrutiny in 
cases where discrete classes of adult citizens are excluded from the vote, 
and a far more restrained attitude where restrictions arise from regulatory 
measures aimed at facilitating the exercise of the vote, or from the rules that 
regulate the link between representatives and the electorate. As a result, the 
court’s jurisprudence tends to underplay the state’s positive duty to protect 
and promote the right, by displacing responsibility onto the voters themselves. 
It also shows a lack of sensitivity to structural impediments to the exercise and 
efficacy of the vote, whether these are rooted in poverty and social exclusion 
or the structures and operation of the (party-)political system. 
Dignity is, however, a contested concept, and we should not be too quick 
to banish it from our understanding of voting rights. The article contends 
that Sachs J’s articulation in August of the right to vote with dignity, equality 
and democratic citizenship has transformative potential. Drawing on the work 
of Margaret Somers and, to a certain extent, Hannah Arendt, it argues that 
dignity, read together with democracy, equality and citizenship, need not 
simply refer to the symbolic value of formal inclusion in the body politic, or 
the purely formal equality of citizens. It can also evoke a richer, more deeply 
egalitarian conception of citizenship – as full inclusion in civil society and 
138 
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the political community, as a bulwark against social and political inequality 
and as a site of democratic struggle. On this basis, a more rigorous voting 
rights jurisprudence could be developed, which is suspicious of attempts to 
disenfranchise marginalised groups of voters, as disenfranchisement is likely 
to sever the last remaining ties of membership in the political community and 
thus to remove the very basis of their rights. Importantly, such a jurisprudence 
would also be sensitive to the ways in which ostensibly neutral electoral 
rules overlap with systemic inequality and structural power to deepen and 
reproduce social exclusion, to privilege certain ways of seeing and thinking 
and to silence voices from the margins. 
The link made by Sachs J between dignity and democratic citizenship 
raises difficult questions relating to the criteria for inclusion in the community 
of citizens. It is tempting to confine it to the circle of nationals, as the court has 
done on one reading of Richter. However, there are good reasons to resist such 
a conflation of citizenship and nationality, as Le Roux and others have shown. 
In an era characterised by the growing disjunction between nationality, 
residency and subjection to state power, we need to reflect critically on the 
implications of the idea that human dignity requires every person to be treated 
as an autonomous subject, and its relation to the democratic principle that 
people who are subject to state power, should have a say in how that power is 
exercised. This could help to open up spaces for new democratic imaginations, 
which challenge nationalist notions of membership and belonging in the name 
of more encompassing understandings of dignity and citizenship. 
SUMMARY
This article asks whether and to what extent the Constitutional Court’s dignity-based interpretation 
of the right to vote can explain the apparent anomalies in its voting rights jurisprudence. It argues 
that the court’s emphasis on the symbolic value of the universality of the vote may blind it to the 
ways in which seemingly neutral measures feed into systemic disadvantage and further the political 
disempowerment of the poor and marginalised. It may also result in shifting the court’s attention 
away from structural issues relating to democratic accountability and electoral competition. Against 
this background, the article asks whether dignity can be reinterpreted and articulated with the values 
of democracy, equality and citizenship, to ground a richer, more deeply egalitarian vision, which 
understands the vote not simply in terms of formal inclusion in the body politic, but as full inclusion 
in civil society and the political community, as a bulwark against social and political inequality and 
as a site of democratic struggle. It also asks whether such a reinterpretation of the right to vote could 
help open up spaces for new democratic imaginations, which could challenge nationalist notions 
of membership and belonging in the name of more encompassing understandings of dignity and 
citizenship.
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